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EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM: A NEW CASE 




I. INTRODUCTION: A LEGAL LENS FOR EDUCATION 
POLICYMAKING 
A crucial part of the debate over education law and policy 
asks: Who should be creating education policy? When 
education policy is formulated, what is at stake is nothing less 
than success in life for our nation’s young people. The twenty-
first century has seen a pronounced shift in the way education 
policy decisions are made, as the educational policy making 
and regulatory epicenter has begun shifting from the state to 
the federal level, particularly with the passage of No Child 
Left Behind (“NCLB”)1 and Race to the Top (“RTTT”).2 
NCLB comprehensively reformed the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the primary federal 
education law.3 Among the major changes were requirements (1) 
that states establish yearly testing of students in grades three 
through eight for reading and math and in three grades for 
science;4 (2) that states establish standards for the adequate 
yearly progress of its students, incorporating a goal of total 
proficiency in all subjects by 2013–14;5 (3) that students be 
allowed to transfer out of schools deemed in need of 
                                                 
* J.D. 2013, University of Michigan Law School; B.A. 2010, Gettysburg 
College. Many thanks to Nick Bagley for his many thoughtful comments during the 
editing process and to the author’s family for inspiration. 
1 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001). 
2 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title VIII, 
123 Stat. 115 (2009); Race to the Top Fund, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688 (Nov. 18, 2009) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. subtit. B, ch. II). 
3 See WAYNE RIDDLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31284, K-12 EDUCATION: 
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001 (P.L. 107-110) 3 (2008), 
available at www.crs.gov (comparing the structure of ESEA pre- and post-NCLB). 
4 Id. at 4. 
5 Id. at 5. 
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improvement;6 and (4) that states develop a number of new 
accountability measures to measure the progress of students 
with limited English language proficiency.7 The focus on 
testing was meant to provide some accountability on the part 
of schools to parents and taxpayers and focus schools’ efforts 
towards groups of students in need.8 
RTTT, on the other hand, was less a legislative program 
and more a set of spending conditions.9 In order to receive 
money from the RTTT fund, states must submit ambitious 
plans in four core areas: (1) adoption of standards geared to 
workplace preparedness, (2) building systems to measure 
student success, (3) increasing teacher effectiveness, and (4) 
improving the lowest achieving schools.10 States were 
encouraged, as part of their funding applications, to develop 
budgets reflecting the changes they proposed, and the 
Department of Education provided guidance as to the size of 
these budgets.11 
For the purpose of this Comment, what is important about 
these programs is not what they contain, but the fact that they 
represent a much larger role for the federal government in 
education. A growing body of legal scholarship argues that an 
increased role for the federal government in education is a 
normatively desirable development. One scholar, for instance, 
argues that limited state bureaucratic capabilities, which she 
asserts have developed compliance functions at the expense of 
true policy expertise, counsel in favor of an increased federal 
role.12 Likewise, Professor Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, who 
served in the General Counsel’s office at the U.S. Department 
                                                 
6 Id. at 5–6 (schools failing to show adequate yearly progress for two consecutive 
years are deemed to be in need of improvement). 
7 Id. at 14–15. 
8 See 34 C.F.R. § 200.13(b)(7)(ii) (stating that adequate yearly progress definitions 
developed by states must apply separately to students in the following subgroups: 
economically disadvantaged students, students from racial and ethnic minorities, 
students with disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency). 
9 See Race to the Top Fund, supra note 2, at 59,840–841. NCLB also conditioned 
receipt of federal education funds on acceptance of certain spending conditions, but 
was a comprehensive piece of legislation, as opposed to the Race to the Top fund, 
which was simply a part of the stimulus package passed under President Obama. 
10 Id. at 59,836 (describing RTTT as a “funding opportunity” and guaranteeing 
only a chance at receipt of federal money in exchange for adoption of these standards). 
11 Id. at 59,840. 
12 Shannon McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for 
Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1546–47 
(2011). 
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of Education,13 noting the persistence of interstate educational 
disparities since Brown v. Board of Education,14 argues that an 
increased federal role in education is necessary because history 
teaches that states are incapable, on their own, of addressing 
disparities in educational opportunity.15 Another scholar argues 
that the central role education has always held in our society 
necessitates recognition of education as a judicially-enforceable 
fundamental right.16 Similarly, Goodwin Liu, recently 
appointed to the California Supreme Court, argues that the 
very text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the concept of 
national citizenship at least authorizes, if not compels, the 
creation of a “common set of educational expectations for 
meaningful national citizenship.”17 However, increased federal 
involvement in education is worrisome for other reasons, 
explored below. This Comment pushes back on scholarship 
that supports federal solutions for the nation’s education issues 
and argues that countervailing considerations militate in favor 
of less federal involvement in education. 
Every state constitution, in contrast with the Federal 
Constitution, contains some guarantee of education.18 State 
                                                 
13 Richmond Sch. of Law, Profile: Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Professor of Law, 
FACULTY, http://law.richmond.edu/people/faculty/krobins2/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15 Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model 
for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1689 (2007); McGovern, 
supra note 12, at 1545 (arguing that interstate resource disparities necessitate federal 
intervention). 
16 Michael Salerno, Note, Reading is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left 
Behind Act Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 509, 540 (2007). 
17 Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 
401 (2006). Notably, Liu does not actually think NCLB accomplishes this, but he 
advocates for an even broader, though somewhat different, legislative response from 
Congress. 
18 Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” than “Equality?”: 
The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education 
Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2002).  Education Clauses vary widely 
in wording. For instance, the State of Montana declares, “It is the goal of the people to 
establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of 
each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the 
state.” MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1). On the other hand, New York provides only that 
“[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free 
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.” N.Y. CONST. 
art. 11, § 1. 
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courts split into two groups on how to give effect to these 
guarantees: (1) by evaluating education policy under Equal 
Protection by declaring education a fundamental right or by 
treating wealth as a suspect classification,19 or (2) by evaluating 
education policies under a framework of educational 
adequacy.20 In either case, these clauses establish substantive 
educational guarantees on the state level that do not exist at 
the federal level and provide the courts with a role in ensuring 
the fulfillment of these guarantees.21 These clauses also help to 
create a valuable political dynamic, which has inured to the 
benefit of children. As part of this political dynamic, courts 
define the contours of these affirmative guarantees, and the 
legislature fulfills its own constitutional duty by legislating 
between those boundaries.22 
However, when the federal government legislates or 
regulates in a given field, it necessarily constrains the ability of 
states to legislate in that same field.23 In the field of education, 
the ability of courts to protect the rights of children is 
dependent on the ability of legislatures freely to react to 
courts. As such, anything that constrains state legislatures also 
constrains state courts and upsets this valuable political 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); 
Horton v. Meskill 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).  
20 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000) (advisory opinion 
declaring that proposed school funding bill would violate state’s duty to provide 
adequate education); Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); 
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
21 But see, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Adequacy & Equity v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 
164 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State of Okla. ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058 
(Okla. 2007). A small minority of state courts, like those in Nebraska and Oklahoma, 
have found educational rights to be nonjusticiable. This problem is dealt with at notes 
161–167 and accompanying text. 
22 See discussion infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text. 
23 For a useful and succinct discussion of pre-emption doctrine, see Alexander K. 
Haas, Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies through Pre-Emption Jurisprudence: 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1929-30 (2001) (discussing 
both field and conflict pre-emption). See also Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1916) 
(inferring that while it is true that where a federal statute does not cover an entire 
field, states are allowed to legislate in those areas omitted from federal regulation: “. . . 
when the situation with which the statute dealt is contemplated, the reasonable 
assumption is that by the omission to extend the statute to the full limits of 
constitutional power it must have been intended to leave the subjects unprovided for 
not beyond the pale of all law, but subject to the power which then controlled them -- 
state authority until it was deemed essential by further legislation to govern them 
exclusively by national authority.”). The contrapositive is where the rubber meets the 
road for the purposes of this Comment: state regulation cannot cover the very same 
ground as federal regulation. 
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dynamic created by the interaction of state legislatures and 
state courts. An expansive federal role in educational 
policymaking is normatively undesirable when it threatens to 
interfere with this political dynamic. This dynamic receives 
scant attention in the literature described above. However, 
mindfulness of this dynamic is crucial to the proper placement 
of the educational policymaking and regulatory epicenter. 
Constraints on state legislatures would not be as 
problematic if the federal government had proven itself adept 
at guaranteeing adequate educational opportunity for all 
students. However, RTTT and NCLB have, in some cases, 
proven remarkably unhelpful for poor and minority 
students.24 These negative outcomes, of course, are not 
guaranteed. However, the fact that federal involvement in 
education has produced undesirable outcomes for poor and 
minority students should cause policymakers to reexamine 
whether it is most desirable for the federal government to play 
such a significant role in education. This Comment argues that 
it is not. 
Using policies adopted in New York State in response to 
RTTT as an example, this Comment argues that the federal 
government should step aside to the extent necessary to allow 
state courts more flexibility to protect the substantive 
educational rights of poor and minority children. Specifically, 
where federal constitutional rights are not at issue, federal 
involvement in education should be minimized to the point 
that state courts have an unrestrained ability to protect the 
educational needs of, and ensure adequate educational 
opportunity for, each state’s children.25 This Comment does 
not argue for an end to all education policymaking at the 
                                                 
24 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
25 Generally, the term “federal constitutional rights” in the context of education 
will refer the right to attend a school not tainted by the vestiges of segregation. See 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 90 (1995) (“Thus, the proper response by the District 
Court should have been to eliminate to the extent practicable the vestiges of prior de 
jure segregation within the KCMSD . . . .”). However, the term might also extend to 
bilingual education. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer held that a 
law prohibiting instruction in any language other than English violated Due Process. 
Id. at 400–03. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court was presented with a 
question about the substantive right to bilingual education, but ducked the 
Fourteenth Amendment question, and settled the case on statutory grounds, id. at 566. 
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federal level. Rather, it argues that the functioning of the 
state’s court-legislature dynamic should act as a limitation on 
the policies enacted at the federal level. The educational rights 
of poor and minority children in particular may be more 
efficiently safeguarded by putting the power in the hands of 
state courts and legislatures, whereas recent federal programs 
have taken that ability from the states in a way that may be 
detrimental to the nation’s youth. 
In particular, the expansion of the federal presence in the 
education arena has changed policymaking dramatically. 
Federal policy will be off limits to the remedial powers of state 
courts and legislatures, limiting the array of options they have 
when seeking to enforce constitutional guarantees of 
education. Unless state courts prove themselves unwilling and 
unable to deal with the structural problems created by 
educational policies, the federal government should assume a 
role that leaves sufficient space for state courts to operate. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II of this 
Comment briefly examines the history of education litigation 
and outlines the contours of the political dynamic that allows 
state-level government actors to efficiently protect educational 
rights. Part III looks at recent federal policies and some of 
their occasionally troubling side effects. In doing so, it also 
explains how these policies interfere with the political 
dynamic described in Part II and why that is problematic. Part 
IV answers some objections to this approach to educational 
reform. 
II. THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC 
The key to the effectiveness of state-level educational 
policymaking is a political dynamic in which courts and 
legislatures work together, but in their own separate spheres to 
effectuate state-level constitutional guarantees of educational 
opportunity. This dynamic has been borne out on the judicial 
side within state-level education litigation. Although the 
education litigation in the federal courts that famously deals 
with segregation and equal access to public schools is more 
well-known, education litigation in state courts, dealing 
pertinently with a certain level of opportunity, is more 
relevant to the current policy debate. 
Section A of this Part traces the historical development of 
education litigation, particularly state-level education 
litigation. Section B then examines the consistent framework 
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that courts across the nation have adopted for dealing with 
education litigation. Finally, Section C looks at how this 
framework translates into a judicially manageable role for the 
courts in education litigation, and the political dynamic that is 
so crucial to education reform. 
A. The Historical Development of State Education Litigation 
Although only state constitutions, and not the Federal 
Constitution, contain language creating a substantive right to 
education in some form, education litigation began on the 
federal level.26 The first wave of education litigation is the 
most well-known. Through the Fourteenth Amendment, this 
wave of litigation sought to remove the stain of de jure 
segregation from public schools.27 Ultimately, of course, this 
wave of litigation achieved its principle purpose of legally 
desegregating public schools in the landmark 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education case.28 However, as one contemporary 
education reformer noted, “soon after the glow began to fade 
from Brown’s initial luster, education reformers saw the need 
to devise political and legal methods for ensuring the provision 
of adequate resources to the large numbers of poor and 
minority students who would continue to attend segregated 
schools.”29 The Supreme Court held in the 1970s that Brown 
did not require integration where any de facto segregation was 
not the result of intentional state action, leaving students in 
                                                 
26 It is well settled at this point that education litigation occurred in three waves. 
See, e.g., Regina Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State 
Responsibility for Educational, Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. 
& L.J. 281, 285 (2007) (outlining the three-waves); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, 
School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1995) (same).  
27 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. 
Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
28 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”). 
29 MICHAEL A. REBELL, ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: 
CONFERENCE SUMMARY 220 (Timothy Ready et al. eds., 2002). Indeed, the Swann 
Court seemed to recognize, despite the optimism of the era, that some schools would 
still be virtually one race, despite the efforts of the school district authorities, and the 
District Courts. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1971). 
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underperforming urban schools without any recourse to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.30 Thus, advocates began to search for 
new legal tools with which to challenge subpar schools.31 
As a result, a second wave of litigation commenced that 
focused on providing all students with an adequate 
educational opportunity. This second wave targeted “wealth-
based inequities in the nation’s education system, which 
allegedly led to children from poorer school systems receiving 
worse educations than children from wealthier school systems . 
. . .”32 Typically, these poorer school systems were also 
predominantly filled with minority students, for whom 
educational opportunity was already endangered, even putting 
to one side these wealth-based inequities.33 
Noting that the inequity in educational opportunity came 
directly from the inequity of the funding system in many 
states, education reformers initially premised the second wave 
of litigation attacking these funding schemes on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1973, one 
of these cases quickly made its way to the Supreme Court. In 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, parents 
of schoolchildren in property-poor districts alleged that Texas’ 
school-funding system, premised on the levying of property 
taxes, violated the guarantee of equal protection.34 The Texas 
school-funding system had been developed at a time when 
Texas had a predominantly rural, dispersed population.35 
However, the discovery of oil had changed Texas’ 
demographic landscape. Although the state had undertaken to 
remedy the funding problems caused by the population shift, 
its solution, particularly property taxes, was premised on the 
amount of assessable property within a given school district.36 
Because of huge disparities in the assessed value of property 
and size of the student population from one district to the 
next, major per-pupil funding disparities existed.37 Still, the 
                                                 
30 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
31 REBELL, supra note 29, at 221–26. 
32 Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The 
Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 559, 560 (1995). 
33See REBELL, supra note 29, at 220. 
34 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). 
35 Id. at 8–9. 
36 Id. at 9–10. 
37 Id. at 11–15 (describing the differences in demographics and funding between 
two school districts). 
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Supreme Court held that Texas’ school funding system did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though one 
dissenting Justice described the system that resulted as “chaotic 
and unjust.”38 Significantly, the Court also held that strict 
scrutiny was not required of state and local education finance 
decisions, indicating that education is neither a fundamental 
right guaranteed by the Constitution nor the impoverished a 
suspect class.39 
State-level education litigation is largely a reaction to 
Rodriguez and the inability or unwillingness of federal courts 
to do what is needed to truly remedy the underlying problems 
in many of our educational systems.40 State constitutional law 
provided two new opportunities for success following 
Rodriguez. First, state guarantees of equal protection are not 
necessarily co-extensive with their federal analogues, allowing 
for protection of education as a fundamental right within the 
state constitution, notwithstanding Rodriguez.41 Second, every 
state constitution contains an additional textual hook: a 
guarantee of education in its constitution,42 indicating that 
                                                 
38 Id. at 55 (“we cannot say that such disparities are the product of a system that is 
so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory”); id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 44.  
40 REBELL, supra note 29, at 223–25 (outlining ways in which Supreme Court 
refused to engage financial equity debates because of the lack of “manageable 
standards”); Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State 
Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2241–42 (2003) (“[Education 
Clauses] gained little attention until federal court doors were closed to education 
reformers.”); Umpstead, supra note 26, at 285. 
41 The fact that some states analyze education claims under state Equal 
Protection clauses, while the federal Equal Protection clause contains no such 
guarantee, is demonstrative of this point. As well, Justice Brennan issued a call for 
state courts to expand protection beyond the scope found within the federal 
constitution, writing that: 
[T]he very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear 
call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus of our double 
protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray the trust the 
Court has put in them. And if that trust is, for the Court, strong enough to override 
the risk that some states may not live up to it, how much more strongly should we 
trust state courts whose manifest purpose is to expand constitutional protections. With 
federal scrutiny diminished, state courts must respond by increasing their own. 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977). 
42 Cover, supra note 18, at 404. See also Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for 
All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 65–67 (1987). 
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education is afforded a higher status on the state level than on 
the federal level. 
Litigators at the state level proceeded under two theories: 
first, Equal Protection and then educational adequacy. Some 
equal protection challenges to education-funding schemes 
initially met with success, even before the Supreme Court’s 
Rodriguez decision.43 Today, a handful of states review 
educational laws under an equal protection framework.44 
However, many state courts, following the Supreme Court’s 
lead, have been reluctant to declare that their own state 
constitutions made education a fundamental constitutional 
right.45 Courts have declared that “local control of schools 
served as the rational basis” for many funding schemes with a 
disparate impact, and some courts “criticized plaintiffs for 
failing to show that funding disparities had a negative impact 
on school children.”46 When state-level Equal Protection failed 
reformers, they turned to educational adequacy theories, 
inaugurating the third wave of educational reform litigation. 
Educational adequacy challenges were premised on 
persuading state courts to endorse a reading of state 
constitutions that required that each child be provided with an 
“adequate” education.47 Adequacy litigation also met with 
success because the states themselves provided the remedy.48 In 
response to new studies suggesting that declining educational 
performance was threatening America’s position as the world 
superpower, states began creating academic requirements and 
testing standards in the mid-1980s.49 These standards provided 
the vague concept of adequacy with substantive content, 
                                                 
43 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) . 
44 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); 
DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford Cnty., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). 
45 See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 642 (Idaho 1975); Northshore Sch. 
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 200 (Wash. 1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 
279–88 (N.J. 1973). 
46 Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 75 (2004). 
47 MARTHA MCCARTHY & PAUL DEIGNAN, WHAT LEGALLY CONSTITUTES AN 
ADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCATION? 7–8, 16–23 (1982) (writing that New York had premised 
its education litigation decisions on something other than the state constitution’s 
Education Clause, which is no longer the case). 
48 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 75 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Neither the majority nor appellants inform us how judicially manageable 
standards are to be derived for determining how much education is ‘enough’ to excuse 
constitutional discrimination.”). 
49 REBELL, supra note 29, at 229. 
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instead of leaving it as an aspirational goal with no clear end 
point.50 As one reformer put it, “standards-based reform also 
put into focus the fundamental goals and purposes of the 
nation’s system of public education” and gave “contemporary 
significance” to Founding-era educational provisions.51 
The standards-based reform movement proved to be a 
significant boon to the reform movement, such that adequacy 
reform lawsuits succeeded in the vast majority of states where 
plaintiffs had not prevailed under equal protection theories.52 
Courts in some states cited specifically to the new state-level 
academic standards when declaring inadequacy.53 Thus, by the 
end of these three waves of education litigation, reformers 
could use one of two legal theories and find success in just 
about any state. 
B. How Courts Rule on Education Cases 
Under either legal theory—equal protection or adequacy—
courts across the nation have followed a similar path when 
passing judgment on education finance schemes. Standards 
provide guideposts for courts ruling on educational adequacy, 
and while these guideposts are helpful for framing either the 
problem or the remedy, they do not substitute for legal 
analysis. Noted education policy reformer Michael Rebell 
identifies four consistent policy themes that dominate 
educational case law.54 Although legislatively-adopted 
                                                 
50 Id. at 230. 
51 Id. Cf. Kagan, supra note 40, at 2249–50 (arguing that the use of standards in 
this manner is flawed and without solid constitutional grounding). 
52 See Daniel Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure 
of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 780 (2008). According to 
the National Education Access Network, as of July 2012, Adequacy Plaintiffs have 
been successful in twenty-three of thirty-six cases. Nat’l Access Network, Education 
Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989 (July 2012), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/School-Funding-%E2%80%98Adequacy%E2%80%99-
Decisions-by-Outcome4.pdf. 
53 Morgan et al., supra note 32, at 566–67 (citing Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. 
Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of 
the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107, 154 (Ala. 1993)). 
54 REBELL, supra note 29, at 239 (“This constitutional core emphasizes that an 
adequate education must (1) prepare students to become citizens and economic 
participants in a democratic society; (2) relate to contemporary, not archaic educational 
needs; (3) be pegged to a ‘more than a minimal’ level; and (4) focus on opportunity, 
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standards provide a useful starting point, the analysis of this 
constitutionally-grounded guarantee traces these policies and is 
thus more fulsome.55 
Rebell’s first policy theme recognizes that educational 
policies should prepare students to be citizens and economic 
participants in an economic society.56 This is a historic goal of 
education reform and policymaking. The idea of education 
being a fundamental part of American citizenship and success 
traces to the nation’s founding. Thomas Jefferson, for 
instance, recognized that some degree of education was 
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in America’s open political system.57 Similarly, 
Benjamin Franklin expressed a belief that education was vital 
to the success of American society.58 Such impulses have well 
outlasted the founding. The ideology behind mid-nineteenth-
century education reforms at the state level was one that 
recognized education as “inextricably linked to America’s 
continued growth and success.”59 Horace Mann, for instance, 
argued that a common school system was necessary “‘to train 
productive workers and loyal citizens.”60 As such, courts like 
New York’s Court of Appeals asserted that “a sound basic 
education conveys not merely skills, but skills fashioned to 
meet a practical goal: meaningful civic participation in 
contemporary society.”61 
                                                                                                             
rather than outcome.”). 
55 As well, although courts are mindful of their policymaking limitations, to 
adopt learning standards as the meaning of “adequacy” would “be to cede to a state 
agency the power to define a constitutional right.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003). 
56 REBELL, supra note 29, at 239. 
57 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting President Jefferson’s 
proposition). 
58 Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in 
Pensilvania (1749), available at www.archives.upenn.edu/primdocs/1749proposals.html. 
In his Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pensilvania, available at 
www.archives.upenn.edu/primdocs/1749proposals.html. Benjamin Franklin declared in 
the first sentence, “The good Education of Youth has been esteemed by wise Men in 
all Ages, as the surest Foundation of the Happiness both of private Families and of 
Common-wealths. Almost all Governments have therefore made it a principal Object 
of their Attention, to establish and endow with proper Revenues, such Seminaries of 
Learning, as might supply the succeeding Age with Men qualified to serve the Publick 
with Honour to themselves, and to their Country.” 
59 Kagan, supra note 40, at 2268. 
60 See Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School 
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1636 (2007). 
61 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 330 (N.Y. 
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The second policy theme Rebell identifies is that 
educational policies need to relate to contemporary, rather 
than archaic, educational needs.62 Case law establishes that 
courts and legislatures have a duty to be mindful of changes in 
educational scholarship, in pedagogy, and in educational 
needs.63 For example, in Alabama, the state Supreme Court 
interpreted Alabama’s constitutional education provision to 
“impl[y] a continuing obligation to ensure compliance with 
evolving educational standards.”64 An awareness of “evolving 
educational standards” was necessary because, ultimately, an 
“appropriate” education would prepare students “for the 
responsible duties of life.”65 Because those responsible duties 
change, so must the education provided by the state. Similarly, 
in Massachusetts, the state Supreme Court established that 
“[t]he content of the duty to educate which the [state] 
Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will 
evolve together with our society.”66 In Washington, the state 
Supreme Court held that “the State’s constitutional duty goes 
beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic” because state 
courts “must interpret the constitution in accordance with the 
demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of 
being atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original 
meaning.”67 This policy theme implies an affirmative duty for 
courts and legislatures to understand how the policies they 
enact affect a student’s ability to participate in society. 
The third overarching policy theme is that educational 
adequacy needs to be calibrated to “more than a minimal” 
level.68 This policy has more relevance to adequacy suits than 
equity suits. The New York State Court of Appeals, for 
                                                                                                             
2003). See also Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 of Crawford Cnty., 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 
(Ark. 1983) (“Education becomes the essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be 
able to appreciate, claim and effectively realize their established rights.”). 
62 REBELL, supra note 29, at 239. 
63 See, e.g., Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 
(Ala. 1993). 
64 Id. at 154. 
65 Id. 
66 McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993). 
67 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978). 
68 REBELL, supra note 29, at 239. 
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instance, stated that “students require more than an eighth-
grade education to function productively as citizens, and that 
the mandate of the Education Article for a sound basic 
education should not be pegged to the eighth or ninth grade . . 
. .”69 This is an implicit recognition that educational adequacy 
must mean more than what is already guaranteed at the federal 
level, since adequacy litigation would be useless if it only 
duplicated federal, and sometimes state, equal protection 
outcomes.70 In Rodriguez, the Court indicated that the denial 
of all education would violate equal protection.71 Particularly 
in states where state guarantees of equal protection are broader 
than the federal analogue, holding that educational adequacy 
is satisfied by a bare minimum of education would render the 
various state constitutional education clauses entirely 
superfluous, because Rodriguez indicates that that work is 
done by equal protection.72 
Finally, the fourth policy theme recognizes that education 
cases focus more on opportunity rather than outcome.73 As the 
New York Court of Appeals put it, “plaintiffs have a right not 
to equal state funding but to schools that provide the 
opportunity for a sound basic education.”74 Tennessee’s 
Supreme Court noted in perhaps stronger language that “the 
legislature’s constitutional mandate is to maintain and support 
a system of public education that affords substantially equal 
educational opportunities to all students.”75 In Montana, the 
                                                 
69 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 331 (N.Y. 2003). 
70 If the various Education Articles and Equal Protection Clauses produced 
identical substantive guarantees, this would render the education clauses essentially 
superfluous, in violation of a well-settled canon of construction. See Stephen M. 
Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
115, 121–30 (2010) (discussing what the author refers to as the “superfluity canon”). 
71 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“Whatever merit 
appellees’ argument might have if a State’s financing system occasioned an absolute 
denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no 
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative 
differences in spending levels are involved and where—as is true in the present case—no 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an 
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”). 
72 But see Charlet v. Legislature of State, 713 So. 2d 1199, 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“If some funding is being provided by the State to every school district, the State has 
met whatever quantification may be implied by the word ‘minimum’ in the 
constitutional provision.”). 
73 REBELL, supra note 29, at 239. 
74 CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 346. 
75 Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWhorter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Tenn. 2002). 
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state Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the guarantee of 
equality of educational opportunity applies to each person of 
the State of Montana, and is binding upon all branches of 
government whether at the state, local, or school district 
level.”76 One commentator has found it “surprising” how many 
cases decided within the “adequacy” framework focused on 
“equality of educational opportunity” or “comparability.”77 
There is no similar focus on outcome. 
As courts have applied this policy framework, a remarkably 
consistent cause of action has developed. In many states, courts 
consciously look at state inputs and outputs within the 
educational system, determining whether the resources 
invested in an education system are sufficient to provide 
students with an adequate opportunity to receive a quality 
education.78 These policies form the basis of the political 
dynamic that is key to educational reform on the state level 
because they are not policies that relate to specific educational 
programs, but rather to constitutional text. These policies are 
the tools that state courts use to ensure legislative fidelity to 
their constitutional duties. 
C. The Interplay Between Courts and Legislatures 
After a court declares that an educational system is 
constitutionally inadequate, there is a need to define a remedy. 
It is the remedial phase,79 rather than the demonstration of 
                                                 
76 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989). 
77 James Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1223, 1232–33 (2008).  
78 Compare Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 
(N.Y. 1995) (“If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources made 
available under the present system are adequate to provide children with the 
opportunity to obtain these essential skills, the State will have satisfied its 
constitutional obligation.”) with Morgan et al., supra note 30 (the authors, the lead 
litigators in the Alabama educational adequacy case Harper v. Hunt, discuss the 
various ways in which they used inputs and outputs to establish constitutional 
inadequacy in Alabama’s educational system.). 
79 By “remedial phase,” the author means that part of a given education lawsuit 
in which the court determines at least the outlines of a remedy to the identified 
constitutional violation. In many lawsuits, the declaration of inadequacy and the 
development of the remedy will not be separate phases of the trial, although they may 
be, particularly where the state legislature completely ignores or is insufficiently 
attentive to the dictates of the state courts. 
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inadequacy, that is the difficult part of education litigation.80 
Courts’ own institutional concerns are at their apex in the 
context of education funding, where allocation of state 
monies is a quintessentially legislative function, as is the 
weighing of competing policy choices.81 As such, courts have 
exhibited a “propensity . . . to defer to the legislature for a 
remedy [as] a workable compromise between the judiciary and 
political branches . . . .”82 Moreover, courts are more likely to 
meet political resistance when they attempt to override 
legislative choices.83 
State courts, therefore, have, for the most part, followed a 
consistent pattern in the remedial phase: after declaring that 
inadequacy exists, and detailing the reasons why, the courts 
remand to the legislature to fashion a remedy.84 In Alabama, 
for example, the state Supreme Court declared that “it is the 
legislature that bears the ‘primary responsibility’ for devising a 
constitutionally valid public school system.”85 Although it 
acknowledged that a trial court might have a role in 
fashioning a remedy, it also recognized that “the judiciary 
should exercise this power only in the event the legislature 
                                                 
80 See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School 
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2011) (“persuading a court that a state 
has violated its constitutional duty to provide an adequate or equitable education is 
only the beginning of the battle”). 
81 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 
359, 363 (N.Y. 1982); Cora True-Frost, Note, Beyond Levittown Towards a Quality 
Education for All: Litigating High Minimum Standards for Public Education—The 
CFE Case, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1015, 1041–42 (2001). 
82 William Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform 
Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1297 (2003).  
83 See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 432, 457–71 (1999) (describing the struggles to remedy school finance systems 
ruled unconstitutional in eleven states, and concluding that in about half of these 
cases the relevant judicial decree was met with a significant amount of legislative 
recalcitrance and public opposition). 
84 See Koski, supra note 82, at 1259 (“Although the separation of powers doctrine 
has proven flexible in describing the role of the court at the liability stage of the 
litigation, all courts that have overturned their educational finance scheme invoke the 
doctrine at the remedial phase.”).  
85 Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869, 882 (Ala. 1997), vacated in part sub nom. Siegelman 
v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 819 So. 2d 568 (Ala. 2001). In Alabama, the public school system 
was declared unconstitutional in part because “Alabama’s poorer school systems are 
among the lowest spending systems in the nation, and include some of the worst 
schools in the country,” and also because Alabama schools failed to meet regional 
accreditation standards. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 126–27 (Ala. 1993). 
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fails or refuses to take appropriate action.”86 In Texas, the state 
Supreme Court was quite explicit that its role went no further 
than declaration of a constitutional violation.87 In New 
Hampshire, the state Supreme Court declared that the state 
constitution conferred a substantive right to education on the 
state’s students, and then subsequently expressed confidence 
“that the legislature and the Governor will fulfill their 
responsibility with respect to defining the specifics of, and the 
appropriate means to provide through public education, the 
knowledge and learning essential to the preservation of a free 
government.”88 In Washington, while fending off a separation 
of powers argument, the state Supreme Court asserted that it 
could declare a constitutional violation and that it was “firmly 
convinced the other branches of government also will carry 
out their defined constitutional duties in good faith and in a 
completely responsible manner.”89 
However, despite their reticence to fully define a remedy 
to a constitutionally inadequate educational system, courts do 
not merely declare inadequacy and then remove themselves 
from the picture, as this would likely do little to actually 
improve the situation. Instead, courts give some measure of 
guidance to legislatures in order for their decrees to have any 
effect. Some scholars see the positive nature of the educational 
right, as contrasted with the negative nature of most federally 
guaranteed rights,90 as counseling an active judicial role.91 For 
                                                 
86 Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d at 882. 
87 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex. 1989) (“[W]e do 
not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it should enact; 
nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has primary responsibility to decide 
how best to achieve an efficient system. We decide only the nature of the 
constitutional mandate and whether that mandate has been met.”). The Texas system 
violated the state constitution because “spending per student varie[d] widely [from 
district to district], ranging from $2,112 to $19,333.” Id. at 392. The court found that this 
was not an “efficient” system as required by the Texas Constitution. Id. at 393–94. 
88 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993). 
89 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 89 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). 
90 See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864–74 
(2001) (discussing negative and positive rights at the federal level and concluding that 
the Bill of Rights is “essentially negative in nature”). Cross distinguishes between 
negative and positive rights as follows: “One category [negative] is a right to be free 
from government, while the other [positive] is a right to command government 
action.” Id. at 864. 
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instance, Professor Jonathon Feldman has argued that 
abdicating from enforcement of positive rights on separation 
of powers grounds “represents a serious misinterpretation of 
the negative separation of powers doctrine.”92 This scholar also 
asserts that “[a] court’s articulation of a legislature’s duty does 
not represent judicial tyranny.”93 Recognizing that 
governmental inertia represents the greatest threat to positive 
rights, he concludes that “[a]s long as the legislature retains its 
core function as policymaker and allocator of public funds, 
the courts may establish the parameters within which 
legislative action must proceed.”94 Similarly, Helen Hershkoff 
has argued for state justiciability doctrines that “respond more 
closely to state and local concerns” and which are not subject 
to the same constraints as Article III courts, in part because of 
the positive rights contained within state constitutions.95 Both 
Feldman and Hershkoff recognize that a right’s character as 
“positive” does not preclude judicial enforcement. Indeed, a 
paradigm within which state courts actively participate in a 
dialogue with the political branches about vindication of those 
rights is likely to produce more fruitful outcomes.96 Professor 
Rebell has noted that judicial involvement in other areas of 
public law, particularly administrative law, has proven 
beneficial to the development of public policy and has not 
been characterized by judicial ineptitude.97 
Courts have taken up this charge to define the scope of 
positive rights and do provide guidance to legislatures.98 
Following a declaration of inadequacy, courts often provide 
certain guidelines consistent with the positive character of the 
                                                                                                             
91 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking 
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of 
Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an 
Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057 (1993). 
92 Feldman, supra note 91, at 1060. For Professor Feldman, the term “negative 
separation of powers” refers to a system in which power is strictly divided between 
three branches of government, as it is in all U.S. jurisdictions. See id. at 1060. 
93 Id. at 1060–61. 
94 Id. at 1091. 
95 See Hershkoff, supra note 91, at 1885–90, 1929. 
96 A typical objection to judicial entrance into policy arenas centers on the 
political insulation enjoyed by judges. While this is certainly true of federal judges, 
who are unelected, this argument carries much less force at the state level, where many 
judges must stand before the populace at regular intervals. 
97 See Michael Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the 
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1531–35 (2007). 
98 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989). 
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substantive educational entitlement.99 In the seminal case Rose 
v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,100 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court outlined what it termed “the essential, and minimal, 
characteristics of an ‘efficient’ system of common schools.”101 
The Kentucky court also held that education was a 
fundamental right in that state,102 arguably justifying an even 
broader judicial role than that otherwise required for the 
enforcement of positive rights. Courts operating within an 
adequacy framework have also followed Kentucky’s lead 
explicitly.103 Such guidance does not violate the very real 
separation of powers concerns that play a large role in 
education lawsuits. This interplay between the judicial and 
legislative branches forms a political dynamic that creates the 
conditions necessary for educational reform.104 Professor 
                                                 
99 Koski, supra note 82, at 1245–52 (describing the early attempts by courts to 
outline the adequacy standard). Professor Koski refers to the “fuzzy standards” that 
courts place on the legislature’s action following a finding of inadequacy as “the ideal 
combination of restraint and activism.” Id. at 1240. 
100 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186. 
101 Id. at 212–13 (“We concur with the trial court that an efficient system of 
education must have as its goal to provide each and every child with at least the seven 
following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient 
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable 
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and 
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or 
her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and 
pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational 
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.”). 
102 Id. at 206. 
103 See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“We 
look to the seven criteria articulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as 
establishing general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”); 
McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (“The 
guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky fairly reflect our view of the 
matter and are consistent with the judicial pronouncements found in other decisions.”). 
104 Professor Greenspahn recounts some encouraging evidence to this effect: 
Elected officials, following state court orders, have increased spending by 11% on 
schools in the poorest districts and by 7% in median districts. Increased funding for 
the neediest districts has increased student proficiency in states such as Kentucky and 
Massachusetts and improved school facilities in others, such as Arizona. Furthermore, 
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William Koski, a noted education scholar and litigator, has 
described the dynamic at play in education adequacy 
jurisprudence: 
A fuzzy standard allows plaintiffs to bring novel actions and permits the 
judiciary to invalidate what it views as an unjust educational finance scheme, 
while those same fuzzy standards permit legislatures to respond to the law in 
the face of competing political demands. Law, under this analysis, does little 
to shape legislative or executive behavior on the books. It is not self-
executing. Litigation and judicial intervention, however, can influence 
legislative behavior, but only to a certain extent. Litigation and a court’s 
decision to strike down an educational finance system can serve as the 
catalyst for legislative reform, as they can provide the political cover for 
reform-minded policy-makers to act. And if the political branches do not 
respond appropriately, the judicial “veto power” can again be invoked.
105
 
As such, it remains true that in the mine run of cases it will 
be the legislature who is responsible in the first instance for 
fashioning the remedy for a constitutionally deficient 
educational system. It is for this reason that extensive and 
growing federal involvement in education is troubling. 
Both NCLB and RTTT attach significant strings to state 
acceptance and receipt of federal funds,106 which are vitally 
important if a state is to create a constitutionally adequate 
education system. Although a state theoretically has a choice as 
to whether or not to accept the proffered federal funds,107 
there is no other actor that can replace the funds that a state 
might otherwise receive from the federal government.108 Given 
                                                                                                             
studies prompted by litigation in more than thirty states have resulted in revisions to 
school funding formulas so that educational resources are delivered based on actual 
student need. Greenspahn, supra note 52, at 780 (citations omitted). 
105 Koski, supra note 82, at 1297–98. 
106 For instance, NCLB required states to develop a plan, to be approved by the 
Secretary of Education, to implement “challenging academic standards” (a term which 
is narrowly defined), and to develop a way meaningfully to ensure that students were 
making “adequate yearly progress” (a term also narrowly defined). See generally 20 
U.S.C. § 6311 (2012) (“State Plans”). RTTT has, in its two rounds, required states to adopt 
certain legislative priorities, required that a State’s Fiscal Stabilization Fund program 
(itself required to receive a Race to the Top grant) be approved by the Secretary of 
Education, and that there be no legal barrier within a state to linking data on student 
achievement (a term defined by the federal government) to teacher evaluation, in 
order effectuate further RTTT goals. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY: RACE TO THE TOP (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf. The limitations 
outlined here are simply examples of the strings attached to federal funding in both 
instances. 
107 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
108 Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. 
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these budgetary realities, as well as the constitutional 
imperative of educating children, state legislatures are 
significantly limited in their ability to reject these federal 
funds. Despite some initial resistance to NCLB,109 every state 
eventually chose to accept the federal money and the attached 
conditions, at least initially. 
Recently, however, due to a provision in the law that 
would have cut off federal funding if states failed to meet 
almost impossible goals,110 most states were granted waivers 
from some of the program’s more onerous requirements.111 
However, these waivers themselves came with conditions 
attached, as the Obama Administration used the waivers to 
force states to adopt favored reforms.112 Thus, these waivers 
simply represent the shift from one federal policy to another. 
On the one hand, attaching such limitations on the use of 
federal money is affirmatively good because it protects federal 
legislative priorities; federalism is a two-way street and 
“[c]oncern for protecting the states should not obscure the 
need to vindicate the authority of Congress to choose whether 
and how to spend its money.”113 
But there is another side to this coin, which is that “[a] 
state’s freedom from federal interference . . . is a freedom to 
                                                                                                             
REV. 195, 212 (2001) (“states in the second group are severely constrained in their 
decision-making by the lack of equivalent, alternative sources of revenue. There is no 
competitor to the federal government to which these states might turn for substitute 
financial assistance.”). Professor Baker also points out that this money might otherwise 
be raised by the states through their own direct taxing authority, except that state 
taxes already compete with federal taxes, and she asserts that “the states implicitly have 
been able to tax only the income and property remaining to their residents and 
property owners after the federal government has taken its yearly share.” Id. at 213. 
109 See Sam Dillion, Utah Vote Rejects Part of Education Law,                          
N.Y. TIMES   (Apr. 20, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/20/national/20child.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&po
sition=&. 
110 NCLB would have required states to achieve 100 percent proficiency in math 
and English by 2014 without an update. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2012). 
111 See Joy Resmovits, No Child Left Behind Waivers Granted to More Than 
Half of U.S. States, HUFFINGTON POST (July 6, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/06/no-child-left-behind-
waivers_n_1652574.html.  
112 See id. 
113 Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89 
(2001). 
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make choices, not just a freedom to choose wisely.”114 As such, 
although “Congress may use its spending power to create 
incentives for states to act in accordance with federal policies[,] 
. . . when pressure turns into compulsion, the legislation runs 
contrary to our system of federalism.”115 This is particularly 
important in the context of education. Where conditions on 
federal money are too restrictive, they limit the array of 
choices available to state legislatures in any given area of 
policy. In the context of education, where a court will 
establish limits on the exercise of legislative discretion but call 
upon the legislature to formulate a remedy in the first 
instance, a state court’s action will be less effective since the 
legislature is already constrained by conditions attached to the 
receipt of federal funds. Indeed, where the effect of the 
federal policy is as harmful as some policies may be,116 the 
court’s ability to vindicate the rights of students might be 
entirely ineffective. This possibility becomes more plausible as 
federal intervention grows. 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
Restrictions on the ability of state legislatures and courts to 
remedy constitutionally deficient education systems are 
problematic, in large part because the federal government has 
proven inept at formulating education policy that is responsive 
to the needs of states. Nothing about the federal government 
suggests that it should be unskilled at formulating education 
policy. However, there are times in which federal education 
policy is ineffective. These instances should force us to ask 
whether and when it is normatively desirable for the federal 
government to be formulating educational policy, particularly 
when a substantive guarantee of some level of educational 
opportunity exists in the vast majority of states but not at the 
federal level. Accordingly, this Part describes instances in 
which federal involvement in education has proven to be less-
than-successful. 
                                                 
114 Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 479 (2003). 
115 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
116 See Part III.A infra. 
2]                      EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM                    303 
  
A. The Example of New York State 
New York, a state that recently adopted a policy developed 
pursuant to RTTT, provides a useful case study for the issues 
raised by federal involvement. New York is useful as a case 
study because of its relatively well-developed adequacy 
jurisprudence, its recent fight over RTTT-inspired policy, and 
the availability of relevant social science evidence. New York’s 
policy was enjoined and then modified, but that result 
developed apart from the state’s educational adequacy 
jurisprudence. However, the very adoption of the policy raised 
the specter of the issues considered in this Comment, making 
this case apt for consideration. 
Subsection 1 briefly covers New York’s adequacy case law. 
Subsection 2 examines the policy that was proposed and which 
would have been enacted absent action by the teachers. 
Subsection 3 applies New York’s adequacy jurisprudence to the 
policy at hand and considers the situation in which the 
legislature might have found itself had the policy been enacted 
and/or litigated in a different setting. 
1. New York’s adequacy framework 
New York’s Constitution requires that the state provide for 
all children “a system of free common schools, wherein all the 
children of [New York] may be educated.”117 New York’s courts 
interpret this to require that the state provide a “sound basic 
education.”118 Consistent with other adequacy cases, New 
York’s Court of Appeals has written that “[s]uch an education 
should consist of basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills 
necessary to enable children to eventually function 
productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving 
on a jury.”119 The State’s constitutional obligation is satisfied 
“if the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources 
made available . . . are adequate to provide children with an 
                                                 
117 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
118 Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 
(N.Y. 1982); see also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 665 
(N.Y. 1995). 
119 CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 666. 
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opportunity to obtain these essential skills.”120 
In interpreting whether or not this obligation is met, like 
most courts, New York courts look at inputs and outputs: that 
is, whether the resources used to educate students provide 
students with adequate educational opportunity.121 The 
“teaching” input has been described as “surely [the] most 
important.”122 In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, the 
New York Court of Appeals rejected an approach that would 
have evaluated teacher quality using only one metric (principal 
evaluation) and instead held that “teacher certification, test 
performance, experience and other factors measure quality of 
teaching.”123 And even where those factors may demonstrate 
adequate teacher quality in some areas of the state, 
the constitutional history of the Education Article shows that the objective 
was to make it imperative on the State to provide adequate free common 
schools for the education of all of the children of the State and that the new 
provision would have an impact upon places in the State of New York where 
the common schools are not adequate.
124
 
Thus, when a policy provides insufficient educational 
opportunity in one area of the state, its sufficiency in other 
parts of the state does not preclude New York courts from 
declaring inadequacy. 
New York courts further require a causal link between 
state action and inadequate educational opportunity.125 Thus, 
“allegations of academic failure alone, without allegations that 
the State somehow fails in its obligation to provide minimally 
acceptable educational services, are insufficient to state a cause 
of action under the Education Article.”126 On the other hand, 
“quality of teaching correlates with student performance.”127 
Where it is state policy that has an identifiable and 
quantifiable effect on the quality of teaching that schools are 
able to provide and there is a causal link to poor student 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 
2003). See also supra text accompanying note 61; Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. 
Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of 
the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993). 
122 CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 333. 
123 Id. at 333–34. 
124 Id. at 333 (quoting CFE I, 665 N.E.2d at 672 (Levine, J., concurring)). 
125 CFE I, 655 N.E.2d at 667. 
126 Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (N.Y. 2003). 
127 CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 334. 
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performance, plaintiffs—generally school boards, school 
districts, parents, and students—have a viable cause of action in 
New York. 
2. New York’s response to RTTT 
Like many other states, New York participated in Phase II 
of the Obama Administration’s RTTT Program, eventually 
receiving $696,646,000 for their application.128 Pursuant to this 
application, New York State adopted a policy that essentially 
made student performance on high-stakes testing—testing that 
carries with it incredibly high consequences, such as student 
eligibility for promotion from one grade to the next129—
dispositive of teacher evaluations.130 Under the policy, student 
scores on yearly high-stakes tests would have comprised 40% 
of a teacher’s yearly evaluation.131 Fortunately, the program was 
enjoined by court order because the implementing regulations 
went beyond the scope of their enabling statutes.132 However, 
the regulation, had it been enacted, would have weighed 
heavily on the educational rights of New York’s racially and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged children. 
For instance, under this policy as it would have been 
implemented in New York City, the measures adopted by the 
Board of Regents would have rated 18% of teachers 
“ineffective”—a number that would have been the highest in 
the nation.133 Such a rating can get a teacher fired after two 
                                                 
128 N.Y. State United Teachers ex rel. Iannuzzi v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State 
of N.Y., 929 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
129 For a general discussion of high-stakes testing, see Rachel F. Moran, Sorting 
and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107 
(2000). 
130 Scott Waldman, Regents Move Bar on Teacher Ratings, ALBANY TIMES-
UNION (May 17, 2011), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Regents-move-bar-on-
teacher-ratings-1382073.php. 
131 Id. 
132 N.Y. State United Teachers, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 703–704. 
133 Yoav Gonen, “18%” of Teachers Get an F, N.Y. POST (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/of_teachers_get_an_bud6BqF1yJ1nlrg9Oji4SO. 
The evaluation system would also have permitted districts to use test scores from math 
and English tests only, meaning that social studies and science teachers could have 
been held responsible for test scores in other subjects. This provision of the Regents’ 
guidelines would also collapse under the analysis of this Note. 
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years, tenure provisions notwithstanding. While such a number 
would likely not have been replicated elsewhere in the state,134 
the over-seven-fold increase in “ineffective” ratings that New 
York City would have experienced would be a likely candidate 
for repetition in other parts of the state, especially in urban 
school districts. While the previous system for rating teachers 
served the interests of neither students nor teachers (because its 
subjective factors were subject to potentially harmful 
manipulation by administrators),135 the new system the Board 
of Regents attempted to institute may have been worse. 
To begin with, the method used for evaluating student 
performance—high-stakes testing—is generally flawed. Racially 
disparate performance on standardized and high-stakes testing 
is a well-documented phenomenon.136 This factor alone would 
suggest that minority students who tend to be concentrated in 
urban school districts137 will score lower than their white 
peers—concentration in certain school districts logically should 
have a heavier impact on those teachers, accelerating turnover 
in those areas. Further, students attending school districts 
without adequate facilities or without enough books to go 
around will be disadvantaged relative to their counterparts in 
more affluent districts even before the school year begins—
without regard for intelligence. In many cases, those students 
living in these poor districts are minorities.138 In New York 
State, these resource disparities still threaten to and often do 
produce huge gaps in scores between affluent suburban and 
                                                 
134 See id. 
135 See, e.g., Q&A on Teacher Improvement Plan, UNITED FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS (May 12, 2010), http://www.uft.org/q-issues/qa-teacher-evaluation-and-
improvement-plan.  
136 See, e.g., Roy O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social Class Bias: A 
Method for Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (2003). The problem is 
not confined to the SAT. See Yasmin Tara Rammohan, Advocates Say Standardized 
Tests Often Flunk Cultural Bias Scrutiny, MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO (May 9, 2007), 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=35935. 
137 Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, 
BROOKINGS REVIEW 29 (1998). 
138 See, e.g., Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., Why Boundaries Matter: A Summary 
of Five Separate and Unequal Long Island School Districts, CENTER FOR 
UNDERSTANDING RACE AND EDUCATION 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/95995.pdf (last accessed Nov. 5, 
2012) (“racial segregation in public schools appears to persist across urban and suburban 
contexts, and the distribution of ‘tangible’ educational resources—e.g. public funding, 
qualified teachers, supplies and good facilities, etc.—roughly correlates with the race, 
affluence and privilege of the students served”). 
2]                      EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM                    307 
  
poorer districts where the majority of students are of non-
white backgrounds.139 
But even apart from the ways in which race and poverty 
serve as proxies for each other within public schools, one study 
that “examined the relationship between a student’s location 
and his or her achievement” found that “for the country as a 
whole, the correlation [between the proportion of a school’s 
pupils in poverty and its average achievement level] is about .5 
or .6. No other single social measure is consistently more 
strongly related than poverty to school achievement.”140 As 
such, students in racially or socioeconomically disadvantaged 
schools are already behind the eight ball with respect to 
student achievement. The use of high-stakes tests to measure 
student achievement gives already vulnerable students yet 
another hill to climb. By making such performance dispositive 
of teacher evaluation, another obstacle develops. As one study 
noting the connection between race, poverty, and 
performance, along with the raw numbers already available 
from New York City, demonstrates, making student 
performance dispositive of teacher evaluations in this way will 
likely have the effect of increasing teacher turnover. 
High rates of teacher turnover provide yet an additional 
disadvantage for minority students, as teacher turnover 
depresses student achievement and disproportionately harms 
minority student achievement.141 This study documented 
                                                 
139 Data collected by the New York Times brings this contrast out in sharp relief. 
See New York School Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/new-york-
schools-test-scores (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). To take one example, the Syracuse City 
School District, the fifth-largest in the state, is 54% black and 66% poor (however those 
terms are defined). For every grade between third and eighth, SCSD’s pass rate was 30–
40% below the state’s median. By contrast, the Fayetteville-Manlius School District, 
which is 4% poor and 2% Black, and which is in suburban Syracuse, boasts pass rates 
among the same age populations which are at least 20% better than the state median. 
140 John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”?: Racial Resegregation, 
High-Stakes Testing, School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. 
L. REV. 1375, 1416 (2003) (quoting ALISON WOLF, NAT’L INST. OF EDUC., 
COMPENSATORY EDUC. STUDY GROUP, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POVERTY AND 
ACHIEVEMENT I–II (1977)). A correlation coefficient of .5 or .6 means that roughly one-
third of the variation is related to the proportion of the school’s pupils in poverty. 
141 Matthew Ronfeldt et al., How Teacher Turnover Harms Student 
Achievement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17176), available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w17176. 
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student performance and teacher turnover (whether a move 
within the same school or a move to a different school 
entirely) in New York City over a five-year period.142 What 
these researchers found, importantly, was that the presence of 
inexperienced teachers by itself could not entirely explain 
variations or drops in student performance.143 Instead, the data 
demonstrated that student performance dropped across the 
board in schools that experienced higher turnover rates, even 
among students who were assigned to teachers who retained 
the same job from year to year.144 The authors posited a 
number of reasons for this, including decreased institutional 
memory and stability and the need to expend institutional 
resources on the hiring process.145 Whatever the reasons, 
another inescapable conclusion was that the effects of teacher 
turnover were felt most heavily by minority students.146 
This research suggests, incredibly, that had the New York 
state teacher evaluation policy been allowed to go forward, it 
might have had the perverse effect of actually harming 
minority student performance over the long term, even 
though it was ostensibly designed to improve that 
performance.147 By tying high-stakes testing performance to 
teacher effectiveness, there is a strong chance that the policy 
would have accelerated teacher turnover, robbing minority 
students, especially those in districts with a high proportion of 
minority students, of a very valuable resource: a stable learning 
environment. 
3. New York’s policy within the adequacy framework 
New York’s policy was adopted in response to RTTT. New 
York is not the only state to move in such a direction.148 
                                                 
142 Id. at 3–4. 
143 Id. at 14. 
144 Id. at 16.  
145 Id. at 18.  
146 Id. at 19. 
147 Other researchers have found similar effects elsewhere. See, e.g., Boger, supra 
note 140, at 1450. Professor Boger noticed that school resegregation in North Carolina 
had coincided with NCLB’s Accountability Tests. Because some funding was attached 
to these tests, and minority students did poorly, many of these schools and students 
became more and more isolated.  
148 See Promoting Innovation, Reform, and Excellence in America’s Public 
Schools, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/fact-sheet-race-top (detailing some efforts made in pursuit of the goals of Race 
to the Top, a competitive block grant program in which certain states are awarded 
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Although New York’s courts managed to turn back a 
potentially disastrous policy, the New York decision was 
grounded in statutory interpretation: the trial court found that 
the policy exceeded the power granted by the enabling statute. 
A simple change in the statute changes the outcome, allowing 
implementation of the policy outlined above. At that point, 
what might aggrieved students have done to protect their 
educational rights? 
Posit for a moment that the New York policy just described 
was to have all of the effects that appear, for the moment, 
only to be frightening possibilities. Imagine that the effect on 
teacher turnover was as great as was feared and that minority 
student achievement suffered or, at best, stagnated while the 
achievement gap grew. If education reformers brought suit 
seeking to have this policy enjoined, they could present a 
persuasive argument that the policy was unconstitutional 
under New York’s current educational adequacy jurisprudence. 
There is strong potential for an identifiable link between the 
policy itself and its impact on educational inputs, particularly 
the teaching input,149 and harm to poor and minority student 
performance,150 and New York law allows for a finding of 
inadequacy even if the deleterious effects are not felt 
uniformly throughout the state.151 
Thus, even if the governor were allowed to implement it, 
this policy might be ruled constitutionally inadequate in New 
York. But the policy was mandated by federal spending 
conditions. Although the vast majority of education clause 
lawsuits to date have been funding lawsuits, some 
commentators now note the possibility of a third wave of 
education litigation beyond the funding context.152 When 
                                                                                                             
money in order to implement proposed reforms, including one reforming teacher and 
student evaluation to student performance). 
149 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 333–34 
(N.Y. 2003). 
150 Cf. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 
1995). 
151 See CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 333. 
152 See Bran C. Noonan, The Fate of New York Public Education is a Matter of 
Interpretation: A Story of Competing Methods of Constitutional Interpretation, the 
Nature of Law, and a Functional Approach to the New York Educational Article, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 625, 628 (2007) (“What set Paynter and NYCLU apart from CFE II and its 
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should a state court declare that a federally mandated policy 
violates the state constitution? The system of teacher 
evaluation in New York was struck down, but there was still 
room in the applicable enabling legislation for a modified 
policy that comported with the dictates of RTTT. 
Constitutional infirmity, on the other hand, may not be so 
flexible. Would the state legislature follow the state court and 
reject the federal money? Or would it spurn the state court, 
arguing perhaps that it is also entitled to interpret the state 
constitution? That the federal government might place state 
courts and legislatures in such an uncertain position is problem 
enough to counsel against such extensive federal involvement 
in education. 
Many of the potential effects of New York’s policy have 
been observed in policies adopted in North Carolina pursuant 
to the Bush Administration’s NCLB.153 Although recognizing 
that accountability measures like those created by NCLB shine 
an important light on previously unexplored issues within 
public education, Professor Boger nevertheless concluded that 
NCLB’s accountability measures were a major part of a perfect 
storm that was threatening educational opportunity for North 
Carolina’s poor and minority students.154 Boger found that “the 
convergence of racial segregation and high-stakes 
accountability testing all but dooms racially segregated, 
economically isolated public schools and their students to 
failure on state accountability tests, entrenching broad patterns 
of grade retention, student demoralization and dropout, and 
parental and teacher flight.”155 Therefore, accountability 
measures “threaten to exacerbate the isolation of African-
American, Hispanic, Native-American, and low-income 
children, with negative consequences both for their access to 
highly performing classmates and for any prospect of 
attracting better, more highly qualified classroom teachers to 
                                                                                                             
predecessors is that the former two cases potentially prefigure the next wave of 
Education Article cases, where the funding system is not the sole source of academic 
failure, or, alternatively, where academic failure continues despite and adequately 
funded school system.”). 
153 Boger, supra note 140, at 1440–41. 
154 See id. at 1448–49. The other parts of the perfect storm were the end of the 
area’s Brown era desegregation decrees, and a prohibition on the use of race conscious 
student assignment plans. Id. at 1378–84. 
155 Id. at 1450. 
2]                      EDUCATIONAL FEDERALISM                    311 
  
their schools.”156 The effects of NCLB Boger described in 
North Carolina are exactly the kinds of effects threatened by 
RTTT in New York. 
Instances like these described in New York and North 
Carolina call into question the wisdom of allowing the federal 
government to set education policy on any kind of significant 
basis. On the one hand, reforms like those undertaken in New 
York, North Carolina, and elsewhere can prove and have 
proven successful.157 However, given the importance of 
education to our success as a nation, the fact that education is 
explicitly provided for at the state level but not at the federal 
level, and existing state-level policymaking levers, that such 
reforms may prove and have proven counterproductive in 
some instances calls into question the whole policymaking 
endeavor. 
For these reasons, policymaking on the federal level is 
undesirable when resulting policies prevent state courts from 
doing their part to ensure meaningful educational opportunity 
and, in doing so, threaten the educational opportunities 
available to poor and minority students. When the federal 
government creates disastrous policy, there is no judicial 
backstop, as exists at the state level. As such, the system of 
education reform that exists at the state level should be 
allowed full freedom to operate, facilitating the interplay 
between state legislatures and courts, thereby providing the 
fullest protection available for poor and minority students. 
IV. SOME METHODOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS 
As with any argument, this Comment’s argument that the 
federal government needs to provide a larger space for state 
courts and state legislatures to formulate educational policy 
contains a number of contestable premises. This Part examines 
a number of the more salient objections that might arise is 
relation to the line of arguments advanced by this Comment. 
                                                 
156 Id. 
157 See, e.g., Mark Schneider, The Accountability Plateau, FORDHAM INSTITUTE 6–
15 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://edexcellencemedia.net/publications/2011/20111215-The-
Accountability-Plateau/20111215-The-Accountability-Plateau.pdf (analyzing the success 
of Texas in implementing NCLB reforms).  
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The objections examined relate to the judicial involvement in 
educational policy formulation that is part and parcel of the 
state court-state legislature dynamic outlined above. This 
dynamic assumes that courts can and should play a useful role 
in education reform, but not all agree with this premise.158 For 
those who see no role for the courts in education, there is no 
need for the interaction between state courts and legislatures 
to provide a limitation on the education policies that are 
enacted at the federal level. However, even those who see a 
role for courts in education reform might still raise significant 
objections to a diminished federal role in setting education 
policy. Although these objections raise important points, 
ultimately none is a sufficient response to the contention that 
state courts and state legislatures should be given ample space 
in order to effectively create constitutionally adequate 
educational policy. 
In the first place, states have not always been very good at 
providing children with even a minimally adequate education, 
suggesting that national educational programs like NCLB and 
RTTT might be necessary. For example, prior to the 1950s, 
many states deprived students of equal educational 
opportunity by segregating their schools. In 1983, the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education published “an open 
letter to the American people” titled A Nation at Risk, which 
found that American students were falling behind their 
international counterparts and that “the educational 
foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a 
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a 
Nation and a people.”159 However, if states are to be 
“laboratories of democracy,” then the federal government 
should not be in the business of ossifying certain educational 
trends. The state courts have not had their final say on this 
matter, and until they do, federal intervention on the level 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923 
(2011) (Book Review). Professor Koski’s book review examines the debate over the 
proper role of courts in education policy. Arguing that courts should play no role in 
education is Eric Hanushek, who has written a number of books and articles making 
this argument, such as the book reviewed by Koski. See ERIC HANUSHEK ET AL., 
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-
ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009). 
159 Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform, available at http://reagan.procon.org/sourcefiles/a-nation-at-risk-
reagan-april-1983.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
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found in NCLB and RTTT is premature.160 
Some state courts, however, may never have their say, as a 
number of state constitutions have clauses that require a strict 
separation of powers, such that education is potentially the 
province only of the legislature and no room is left for judicial 
involvement.161 These clauses have provided the basis for a 
number of state court decisions that have rejected attempts to 
have state funding schemes declared unconstitutional despite 
the existence of textual guarantees of education.162 However, 
one study by Professor Scott Bauries has found that such 
constitutional text is in no way dispositive of claims of 
educational inadequacy.163 This is consistent with the recent 
experience in Colorado, where the state’s highest court self-
consciously created a standard of review that tolerated local 
                                                 
160 See, e.g., Paynter v. State of New York, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003). In Paynter, 
id. at 1229, plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that New York’s school assignment 
policies had led to increased segregation in the public schools, and thus poorer 
performance by minority students, who alleged a violation of New York’s education 
clause. The New York Court of Appeals rejected that contention because plaintiffs 
alleged no causal link to state action, but at the same time recognized “that [plaintiffs] 
cite research correlating concentrated poverty and racial isolation with poor 
educational performance, and that evidence founded on such research might enhance 
an otherwise sufficient Education Article claim. . . . Finally, as a logical and 
jurisprudential matter, we recognize that in CFE I we addressed the sufficiency of the 
pleadings then before us and had no occasion to delineate the contours of all possible 
Education Article claims.” 
161 See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of 
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 701 (2010) (examining the impact of explicit textual separation of powers in state 
constitutions). For instance, the New Jersey Constitution provides that “The powers of 
the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch 
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as 
expressly provided in this Constitution.” N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1. Professor Bauries 
identifies consitutitional provisions in nineteen other states in which adequacy 
lawsuits were brought that contain similarly explicit provisions separating legislative, 
executive, and judicial power. See Bauries, supra at 762–72. 
162 See, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Adequacy & Equity v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 
(Neb. 2007). 
163 Bauries, supra note 161, at 746. Concerns over justiciability may be overblown, 
anyway, as only a small minority of states that have been confronted with adequacy 
challenges have declared state funding schemes nonjusticiable. See Tang, supra note 76, 
at 1208. When Mr. Tang’s article went to print, only eight of thirty-two courts that had 
been presented with the question had ruled on justiciability grounds. Since then, 
Nebraska and Oklahoma have followed suit. See supra note 21. 
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differences even though the state constitution explicitly 
required the establishment of a “thorough and uniform” 
system of schools.164 Indeed, instead of finding that 
constitutional text governing the separation of powers has any 
kind of consistent impact on the outcome of education 
finance cases, Bauries concludes that “if a litigant in an 
education finance adequacy suit were to succeed at convincing 
the court that the education clause guarantees individual 
rights, rather than simply spelling out discretionary legislative 
duties, the litigant would be virtually guaranteed to win the 
case” and have a court declare inadequacy.165 The existence of 
certain constitutional text has virtually no bearing on whether 
this argument can be successful. That a court would need to 
reach such a conclusion about individual rights goes directly to 
the issue of whether any justiciable remedy exists. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that courts have 
demonstrated that they are not bound by separation of powers 
clauses, some state courts have found that their state 
constitutions do not contain any substantive guarantee of 
some level of educational opportunity.166 In these states, there 
are few, if any, opportunities for litigants to convince courts 
to prod state legislatures to give meaningful content to 
positive educational rights, and there is no court-legislature 
dynamic with which federal policies like NCLB and RTTT can 
interfere. However, this does not mean that resort to the courts 
in other states is misguided or unhelpful, even for those 
students in states without constitutional guarantees of a 
certain level of educational opportunity. Indeed, “trends in 
education show a remarkable tendency to follow a national 
pattern.”167 Even in those states in which the courts have a very 
limited role, legislatures should pick up on trends from outside 
of their borders, where the interplay between the legislature 
and the courts is working. This would be problematic where 
                                                 
164 Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 374 (Colo. 2009) (reviewing education clause claims 
for a rational basis); COLO. CONST. art IX, § 2. Bauries, supra note 161, also demonstrates 
rather forcefully that separation of powers clauses do not preclude justiciability. 
165 Bauries, supra note 161, at 750. 
166 See, e.g., Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999) (declaring state 
funding scheme a nonjusticiable political question); Charlet v. Legislature of State of 
La., 713 So.2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (Louisiana constitution requires only that State 
provide a “minimum education” which was met because state funding levels amounted 
to more than a “mere pittance.”). 
167 Kagan, supra note 40, at 2265. 
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educational systems in the neighboring states themselves are 
doing poorly. A system that is doing poorly, however, also 
sends a signal to try something else, and that something else 
may yet yield positive results. But where reforms are 
mandated, as through NCLB and RTTT, the ability of states 
to innovate or pick up on trends is stunted. 
If, however, reformers and advocates are uncomfortable 
waiting for educational reform to trickle across state borders, 
then the proper solution is to create a substantive right to 
education, enforceable at the federal level through suits under 
Section 1983 or otherwise through the courts.168 This solution, 
though, is anathema to our traditional ideas about local 
control of education, an idea engrained in decisions at both the 
state and federal levels and an idea substantiated by the need 
for educational policy to respond to local concerns.169 Further, 
a federal right that is not lodged at the constitutional level 
could, rather problematically, easily be repealed.170 
A second problem with giving the courts a major role in 
formulating education policy—and a concern that would also 
                                                 
168 Although the remedial scheme is somewhat complicated, this is generally the 
approach taken with respect to students with learning disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1403 
(2012) (abrogating state sovereign immunity for violations of Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and allowing for remedies both at law and equity 
for violations of IDEA). The IDEA requires states to establish administrative 
procedures for handling disputes as to the implementation of procedures required by 
the IDEA, with different requirements established for the subchapters dealing with 
children to age two, 20 U.S.C. § 1439 (2012), and those aged three to twenty-one, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415 (2012). The circuits are currently split over whether a Section 1983 claim 
may be brought for violations of the IDEA. See Candace Chun, Comment, The Use of 
§ 1983 as a Remedy for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: 
Why It Is Necessary and What It Really Means, 72 ALB. L. REV. 461, 482–90 (2009) 
(five circuits disallowing such claims, two circuits allowing, two circuits with some 
decisions recognizing such claims and others barring, and three circuits yet to rule on 
the issue). Regardless of the availability of Section 1983 claims, the remedial scheme for 
violations of the IDEA affecting those aged three to twenty-one provides for the 
ability to appeal the administrative decision to “any State court of competent 
jurisdiction or any district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in 
controversy.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012). In any case, the IDEA creates, for students 
with disabilities, a substantive, enforceable entitlement to a “free appropriate public 
education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012). 
169 See McGovern, supra note 12, at 1529–32. 
170 Of course, a constitutional amendment could solve this problem, as well. 
However, because it is so difficult to amend the Constitution, this Comment does not 
consider this option seriously. 
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exist by giving the federal courts a say in this arena—is the 
inherently slow-moving nature of the court system. It takes a 
significant amount of time for a case to work its way through 
multiple levels of the court system. This delay would seem to 
negate the flexibility required by an adequacy framework. 
However, state courts, particularly in this context, do not 
speak only through the final judgments of their highest 
benches. In a system in which the courts are responsible for 
prodding the legislature and fighting inertia, the elected 
branches can also respond to filed suits, trial court orders, or 
evidentiary studies commissioned specifically for education 
litigation.171 That a court’s docket might be clogged does not 
counsel against using the judiciary for these purposes. Even 
filing a suit can have an effect, although it may take years for 
any case to reach a state’s highest court. 
None of these objections to judicial involvement in the 
formulation of education policy is a sufficient response to the 
claim that state courts should be given ample room to 
effectuate state-level constitutional guarantees. These 
objections do serve as correctives to any impulse to rely too 
heavily on litigation as the medium of change in the realm of 
educational policy, and it is no mistake that the political 
dynamic outlined above envisions a significant role for the 
political branches even given active judicial involvement. 
Ultimately, however, the importance of education, its 
constitutional stature on the state level, and the positive nature 
of existing substantive educational guarantees are compelling 
reasons to preserve a meaningful judicial role in educational 
policymaking. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When we, as a nation, consider how best to provide 
adequate educational opportunity to as many students as 
possible, one critical question that must be answered is at what 
level these decisions are best made. This means developing an 
awareness of both where students may most effectively 
vindicate their own interests and where these decisions may be 
made most efficiently. NCLB and RTTT represent a belief 
that education policy may be usefully directed, if not dictated, 
at the federal level. As this Comment argues, these decisions 
                                                 
171 See Greenspahn, supra note 52, at 1380. 
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are best made on the state level. Substantive constitutional 
guarantees of education can be found in every state, entitling 
students to an adequate level of educational opportunity. 
These guarantees provide a role for both state courts and state 
legislatures in vindicating the national educational interest in 
ensuring educational opportunity for all. 
The very nature of the educational right—positive in 
character—requires active government involvement. As 
Feldman recognizes, legislative inertia and not judicial 
overreach is the primary barrier to adequate vindication of 
positive rights.172 Part of this active government involvement 
must come from the judicial branches, which are in a position 
to prod the legislature to act where educational quality falls 
below some minimally adequate level. 
The judiciary is the ultimate defense against the legislative 
inertia that threatens the ability of poor and minority students 
to obtain an adequate education. Educational adequacy 
litigation began to open new doors and expand beyond 
funding precisely at the moment that federal involvement, 
through NCLB and RTTT, began to grow to such a level as to 
threaten to interfere with judicial intervention in education.173 
This potential pitfall is precisely the reason why the federal 
government should not take such an active role in education. 
Courts are important players in education reform not by 
articulating the content of educational policy but by setting 
the rules governing how education reform can proceed. 
Educational reform involves an important give and take as 
interested parties advance their own solutions, but there are 
constitutional limits on this give and take that should be 
defined by state courts. The experience of educational 
adequacy lawsuits indicates that there is an important political 
dynamic at play here, which involves courts and ultimately 
inures to the benefit of students, as all education reform 
should. 
To the extent that the federal government is involved, 
through programs like NCLB and RTTT, that involvement has 
the potential to diminish the effectiveness of state legislative 
                                                 
172 Feldman, supra note 91, at 1089. 
173 See, e.g., Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2003).  
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response to state courts by binding the legislature to the 
requirements of federal funding programs. Thus, through 
NCLB and RTTT, the federal government threatens this 
valuable political dynamic in which courts play an important 
role in vindicating the substantive educational entitlements 
enjoyed by students. Although state legislatures may be able to 
respond to both the federal government and to state courts 
simultaneously, the very real possibility that state legislatures 
may, in some instances, be placed in an untenable position 
between federal requirements and state court dictates should 
counsel against extensive federal involvement in education. 
An adequacy framework for educational policy requires 
more than that a state legislature commit to a certain level of 
education funding. It requires also that a legislature be 
sensitive to the ways in which educational policies, especially 
those that go beyond the funding context, affect student 
performance and achievement. NCLB and RTTT focus 
legislatures in ways that may not actually be helpful. These 
policies may have any number of constitutionally relevant 
consequences, particularly for poor and minority students. 
There is a role for courts to play in educational policy, and 
that role is to make sure that legislatures remain sensitive to 
the ways educational policies affect students and especially 
that they remain sensitive to the unique challenges posed to 
racially and socioeconomically isolated students within our 
educational systems and society. State constitutional text 
demands that closing the achievement gap cannot merely be a 
legislative priority. State courts cannot effectively play that 
role in a system riddled with federal commands. There are 
reasons for federal involvement in local educational policy, 
but protection of student interests counsels in favor of more 
restrained involvement, rather than the ever-expanding role 
the federal government has given itself in the last decade. 
 
 
